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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Appellant Tyler Clapp's petition for

post-conviction relief The order of summary dismissal should be reversed in part because the
court dismissed all of the fifth cause of action and part of the first cause of action on grounds not
raised by the state in its motion for summary disposition without giving Mr. Clapp any prior
notice of its intent to dismiss on those bases. Further, the fifth cause of action is clearly
meritorious.
B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
Mr. Clapp filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief challenging the district court's

decision to revoke probation and impose a slightly reduced sentence. R 4. He attached
transcripts from the probation revocation proceedings to the petition. R 16; 20-33. He attached
an affidavit from his father, Christopher Clapp, as well as documents from the underlying
criminal case and some medical records. R 18; 34-37. And he also filed his own Affidavit of
Facts in Support of Post Conviction Relief. R 45-46.
The respondent answered the petition and later moved for summary disposition. R 48;
65. Attached to the respondent's brief in support of its motion was a copy of the judgment in the
underlying criminal case (R 109), a copy of the Statement of Defendant's Rights in Felony Case
(R 112), and a copy of the probation violation report (R 76-80). The respondent also attached a
copy of the transcript from the October 20, 2011, probation violation hearing (R 93-106) and the
November 10, 2011, probation violation dispositional hearing in the underlying criminal case. R
81-90. Finally, the respondent attached a copy of the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion from

the direct appeal. R 107-108.
Mr. Clapp moved for the appointment of counsel (R 116), but also filed a timely response
to the respondent's motion to dismiss. R 124 (Styled as a "Motion to Dismiss State's Motion for
Summary Disposition"). Attached to that pleading was a copy of the SAPD brief from the
sentencing appeal in his case. R 134-139. The Court appointed counsel and stayed proceedings
for 30 days "to enable appointed counsel to familiarize him/herself with the case and to prepare
any amended petition or amended briefs as appropriate." R 146. Counsel filed an Amended
Petition. R 200.
The Amended Petition alleged five causes of action which are set forth in the left column
in the table below. Relevant to this appeal, Mr. Clapp argued that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not seeking a mental health examination and for not providing mental health
records to the court before the dispositional hearing. R 201. He also argued that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the court violated Mr. Clapp's due process rights
by considering unreliable evidence at the dispositional hearing. R 205.
The respondent filed an Answer generally denying each of the five causes of action. R
220. It then filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and a Brief in Support. R 225-226. It
argued that the five causes of action should be summarily dismissed as set forth in the middle
column in the table below. The Respondent also attached the report of probation violation and
the transcripts of the probation violation proceedings as Exhibits A-C to its brief. R 237-252
(transcript of admit/deny hearing); 253-257 (probation violation report); 254-267 (transcript of
dispositional hearing).
In response, Mr. Clapp argued that trial counsel improperly advised him to proceed to
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disposition without a new mental health examination and that the reports from Nampa Medical
Center, which were available to counsel, but not presented to the Court, showed the need for an
updated evaluation. R 268-269. And he argued that his due process rights were violated when
the court relied upon unreliable hearsay statements, i.e., the disputed probation violation
allegation that he had been driving, which was dismissed by the state, and that his appellate
attorney was ineffective for failing to raise that issue on appeal. 2 7 0-2 71.
The court granted the respondent's motion without holding a hearing. R 274. It
dismissed the first and fifth causes of action for the reasons shown in the right column in the
table below.
AMENDED PETITION

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

COURT'S RULING

1. Trial counsel was
ineffective for "fail[ing] to
properly investigate and
obtain evidence in mitigation
of the crime; to wit: mental
health treatment records from
Nampa Medical, and an
updated mental health
evaluation that complied with
the requirements of Idaho
Code 19-2524." R 201.

1. This ineffective
assistance of trial counsel
should be dismissed because
"the Defendant had a Mental
Health Evaluation performed
a year earlier. ... The
Defendant acknowledged this
and states that use of the prior
Mental Health Evaluation
was appropriate." R 230.

1. Trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to
obtain an updated mental
health evaluation because
both trial counsel and Mr.
Clapp told the court one was
not necessary. In addition,
Mr. Clapp informed the court
that he had been suffering
from depression and that he
had been treated for it.
Therefore, the court had the
information which the
Nampa Medical records
showed at the time of
sentencing. R 280.
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5. Ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failing
to raise a challenge to the
district court's use of
unreliable hearsay that he was
driving at the probation
violation dispositional
hearing. R 205.

5. This claim should also be
dismissed because there is no
right to confrontation at
probation dispositional
hearings. R 23 3.

5. Appellate counsel was
not ineffective for failing to
raise a due process challenge
to the allegation that Mr.
Clapp was driving because it
was supported by substantial
evidence and the Court found
it to be credible.
Furthermore, there was
sufficient unchallenged
evidence in the record to
justify revocation of
probation without the
disputed evidence. R 284.

A Final Judgment was filed and this appeal timely follows. R 288; 290.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in dismissing the portion of Mr. Clapp's first cause of action,

i.e., that counsel was ineffective for not providing mental health records to the court, on a basis
which was not raised in the state's motion for summary disposition without giving Mr. Clapp
twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that basis?
2. Did the district court also err by dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action on an
alternative basis which was not raised in the state's motion for summary disposition without
giving Mr. Clapp twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss on that basis?
3. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action because the
allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving was not supported by sufficiently reliable evidence
and thus should have been challenged on appeal?
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred by Dismissing a Portion of Mr. Clapp's First Cause ofAction
on a Basis not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First
Giving Him Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis
1.

Facts Pertaining to Argument

On October 20, 2011, Mr. Clapp admitted two probation violations. First, that on July
27, 2011, he admitted that he drank beer on five or six occasions while on probation. Second, he
admitted that he was intoxicated when he turned himself into the Ada County Jail on August 5,
2011, for three days of discretionary jail time for that previous violation. R 242 (T pg. 5, ln. 713).1

Defense counsel told the court that a new mental health assessment would not be needed
because one had been completed about a year earlier. R 242 (T pg. 6, ln. 2-14). The court also
questioned Mr. Clapp about the need for an updated mental health evaluation:
Q. Do you understand in this case those evaluations were performed slightly more
than a year ago and that you have agreed that there's no need to update those
evaluations?
A. Yes, sir, I understand.

Q. I know that you had to consult with Mr. Geddes with regard to that. I'm not
wanting to make any inquiry into what conversations you had. But do you have
any reservations you want to express to me about that?
A. My drinking is -- I don't drink as much as I did when the evaluation was taken,

and I'm now on medication. Those two issues I would think would [not2] reflect

The transcripts from the probation revocation proceedings are included in the clerk's
record in this case. Mr. Clapp cites to the page in the record where the transcript appears and
also to the page and line numbers of the transcript.
1

It is obvious from the context that Mr. Clapp is telling the court that the PSR would not
accurately reflect the fact that he was now drinking less and was on medication. Mr. Clapp either
2
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accurately in the older PSI. That's my only issue that I have with it.
Q. Who were you treating with? Terry Reilly?
A. Terry Reilly Clinic, Dr. Shane Vlcek.

Q. And is that over inA. That's here in Boise.
Q. If requested to do so, would you sign a waiver to obtain those treatment
records so that we could have those in the presentence report, or you could
provide them to your attorney so that he could supplement the record with those
treatment records?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. If you wish to do that, then, the court would have no objection to that
information being provided to assist the court in sentencing. All right?
A. All right.
R 243-44 (T pg. 12, ln 15 - pg. 13, In. 22).
However, trial counsel did not obtain the psychological records from the Terry Reilly
Clinic. He did tell the court that Mr. Clapp "was struggling with unemployment and some
significant mental health issues, which he has had for - on and off for awhile, mostly relating to
depression. [il] As we know, alcohol abuse certainly exacerbates depression." R 263 (T pg. 7,
In. 15-20). Counsel did note that Mr. Clapp "was working with a doctor to address his
depression issues." R 263 (T pg. 8, ln. 18-20.) Along these lines, counsel argued that Mr. Clapp
was "essentially homeless" for "a significant period of time" and "was really struggling" and
concluded that Mr. Clapp's "life's circumstances ... did build up against him did take a toll on

misspoke or the transcript is incorrect. Mr. Clapp alleged in his affidavit in support of his pro se
petition that he informed appellate counsel "in writing that there was an error in the transcripts
with regard to the PSI." R 45.
6

his mental health. And when he really started to get depressed and looked at his situation ... it
was a pretty grim picture. And he admits that he had moments of weakness and began to drink."
R 264 (T pg. 9, ln. 7-22).
Mr. Clapp told the court that he had relapsed with alcohol, but had "decided to go see a
doctor at the Terry Reilly Clinic. After some tests and stuff, he prescribed fluoxetine, that I am
still on in the jail. Being on my meds improved my overall daily mood and mostly solved my
self-medicating with alcohol." R 265 (T pg. 13, ln. 13-18). He continued, "[a]nd I think my
medicines have helped and finally gave me a fighting chance to stay sober. I significantly
reduced my drinking from almost daily last year to a handful of relapses this year. [1] And
whenever I do get out, I am going to have my meds slightly increased and have no relapses. And
I think that's the key to my sobriety[.]" R 265 (T pg. 14, In. 1-8).
The court, without discussing Mr. Clapp's mental health issues other than to say that "I
have got to think about more than just what's good for Tyler Clapp," reduced his sentence from
ten years with three and one-half years fixed to ten years with three years fixed and imposed that
sentence. R 265-66 (T pg. 15, ln. 7 - pg. 17, ln. 19).
As noted above, Mr. Clapp alleged in the first cause of action of his Amended PostConviction Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for his "failure to properly investigate and
obtain evidence in mitigation of the crime; to wit: mental health treatment records from Nampa
Medical, and an updated mental health evaluation that complied with the requirements of Idaho
Code 19-2524." R 201.
The state argued that this claim should be dismissed because "the Defendant had a Mental
Health Evaluation performed a year earlier. ... The Defendant acknowledged this and states that
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use of the prior Mental Health Evaluation was appropriate." R 230-1. The trial court dismissed
the portion of the claim dealing with failure to request an updated mental health evaluation as
follows: "Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an updated mental health
evaluation because both trial counsel and Mr. Clapp told the court one was not necessary. R 280.
However, it went on to dismiss the portion of the claim relating to the failure to obtain medical
records on a basis not argued by the state in its motion: "In addition, Mr. Clapp informed the
court that he had been suffering from depression and that he had been treated for it. Therefore,
the court had the information which the Nampa Medical records showed at the time of
sentencing." R 280.

2.

Why Relief Should be Granted

Here, the district court's reason for dismissing the claim that trial counsel should have
obtained Mr. Clapp's medical records for consideration by the court was not raised in the state's
motion. Therefore, the dismissal of that part of the first cause of action was sua sponte and
without proper notice.
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App.
2009):
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to I.C. § 194906( c), if the state files and serves a properly supp01ied motion to dismiss,
further notice from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State,
127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b),
but not section (c), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is
that, under subsection (c ), the motion itself serves as notice that summary
dismissal is being sought. Id. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b )(I) requires
that the grounds of a motion be stated with 'particularity.' See De Rushe v. State,
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146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009) (reiterating the requirement ofreasonable
particularity in post-conviction cases.) lfthe state's motion fails to give such
notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if
the court first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to
dismiss and the ground therefore pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). See
Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. Similarly, where the state
has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application
on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its
own initiative and the court must provide the twenty-day notice.
147 Idaho at 517, 211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismisses a claim based upon
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and
accompanying memoranda -- the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20-day notice period."); see also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 (Ct.
App. 2010) (Noting that if the court dismisses on grounds not presented in the state's motion, the
petitioner has no opportunity to respond and attempt to establish a material issue of fact.).
Although Mr. Clapp is not required to show he was prejudiced by the court's lack of
notice, it is worth noting that he attached reports from the Nampa Medical Clinic to his prose
post-conviction petition. The document confirmed that he had been prescribed fluoxetine for
depression. Further, the medical report noted that Mr. Clapp's scoring on the PHQ-9 "suggests
major depression." 3 It went on to note that his "[t]otal score is 15. Warrants treatment for
depression, using antidepressant, psychotherapy and/or a combination of treatment. Scoring
suggests patient's functionality is impaired." R 43. This document confirms what trial counsel
and Mr. Clapp told the court at the dispositional hearing but also goes further because it

Major depression is included in the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's
definition of"Serious Mental Illness." IDAPA 16.07.33.15(d).
3
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describes the severity of Mr. Clapp' s depression, suggests the lost of functionality in his day-today life which helps to explain his relapse, and sets forth a recommended treatment plan.
This Court should vacate that portion of the order of dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.

B.

The District Court Erred by Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth Cause ofAction on a Basis
not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First Giving Him
Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis
1.

Facts Pertaining to Argument

Mr. Clapp's fifth cause of action was that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a challenge to the district court's use of unreliable hearsay at the probation violation
dispositional hearing. R 205. The state moved for summary disposition arguing that the claim
should be dismissed because there is no right to confrontation at probation dispositional hearings.
R 233. The court dismissed the claim for two reasons: 1) appellate counsel was not ineffective
for failing to raise a due process challenge to the allegation that Mr. Clapp was driving in
violation of probation because it was supported by substantial evidence and the Court found it to
be credible; 2) there was sufficient unchallenged evidence in the record to justify revocation of
probation without the disputed evidence. R 284.
2.

Why Relief Should be Granted

The district court's reasons for dismissing the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective
were not raised in the state's motion. Therefore, the dismissal of the first cause of action was in
part sua sponte but the court failed to give Mr. Clapp the twenty days notice required under LC. §
l 9-4906(b ). Therefore, the dismissal of this claim should be reversed under Buss v. State, supra.
However, if this Court does not reverse for lack of notice, it should reverse because the court's
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basis for dismissal is in error.
C.

In the Alternative, the District Court Also Erred in Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth
Cause ofAction on the Merits of the Claim. Mr. Clapp Presented a Prima Facie Case
That Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Claim That the
Evidence That Mr. Clapp was Driving was not Sufficiently Reliable to be Considered
1.

Facts Pertaining to Argument

A Probation Violation Report was filed on August 11, 2011. The Report, written by
probation officer Darla Maqueda, alleged seven terms of probation had been violated. The two
terms relevant here are that Mr. Clapp had been drinking, which he admitted to at the probation
violation hearing, and the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving, which he denied. R 77-78.
Specifically, the report alleged that:
On July 27, 2011, the defendant admitted to driving his dad's truck knowing that
he does not have a valid license. He reported the last time he drove was on July
13, 2011. When asked on other specific dates he has been driving, he could not
recall, but stated it has been a lot.
R 77. Mr. Clapp admitted to violating his probation by drinking and the state dismissed the
other allegations. The agreement allowed the state to argue about all the allegations at the
dispositional hearing. R 96 (T pg. 5, ln. 7-16; pg 6, ln. 21-25). After the admission to the
probation violation, Mr. Clapp asked the court to set bond pending disposition. The state
opposed the granting of bond arguing, in part, that Mr. Clapp's admitted use of alcohol combined
with the information that "[t]he defendant has admitted to his probation officer that he has driven
on many occasions" militated against the granting of bond. R I 00 (T pg. 21, ln. 12 - pg. 22, ln.
7). Mr. Clapp's attorney responded:
That in regards to those other allegations, my client denies them adamantly. I did
speak to his father. His father seems to confirm his position on there that that was
a falsehood. [if] Obviously, I don't know the answer to that question, but his
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probation officer clearly thought he was driving or indicated that he admitted to
driving, Tyler says that is not true.
R 100 (T pg. 22, In. 10-18).
At the dispositional hearing, the state asked that the sentence should be imposed and
argued:
And in reviewing the probation officer's report of violation ... he has admitted to
her that he is driving again, last admitted driving on July 13 th of 2011. In fact, he
can't really recall the exact dates and times he has been drinking, but he has been
driving his dad's truck a lot. So he's drinking; he is driving; and he is not taking
advantage of the programming that this Court ordered him to do.

Mr. Clapp continues to do what Mr. Clapp wants to do and that is to drink and
that's to drive. And ifhe is going to do those two things, Your Honor, he is a
danger to have in this community. And ifhe is a danger, he needs to have his
sentence imposed.
R 86 (T pg. 5, In. 19 - pg. 6, In. 20). The Court agreed:
Every time you get intoxicated, and in terms of probation violations here, you
didn't make CAP aftercare, and then driving in your father's truck regularly.
Now, it is only one small step to driving the truck regularly and driving the truck
intoxicated. You weren't supposed to be driving a vehicle. And you are putting
not only yourself at risk when you do that, you are putting the public at risk as
well.
And it would be bad enough that if you just go out there and you get drunk and
you drive and kill yourself, but if you kill some innocent third party, that's about
the worse outcome you can have.
R 88 (T pg. 15, In. 23 - pg. 16, In. 11).
Mr. Clapp filed a Notice of Appeal from the order revoking probation and imposing the
amended sentence. Mr. Clapp alleged the following about his relationship with his appellate
counsel:
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The Idaho State Appellate Defender in this case represented Petitioner on appeal
in this case. The Petitioner informed appellate counsel that he wished to
challenge the court's reliance upon evidence that Petitioner deemed unreliable in
the Petitioner's Report of Violation, particularly the claim that he was "driving a
lot" as reported by his probation officer. In addition to challenging the length of
the sentence, Petitioner asked appellate counsel to challenge the sentence on due
process grounds and for a challenge to the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
Petitioner asserts that Appellate counsel advised him that he did not know too
much about "due process" grounds for relief and failed to file any kind of an
appeal except for an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner contends that he has merit to his due process challenge under federal
and state law. (See State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 303 P.2d [sic] 627 (2013)

for due process overview ofguidelines pertaining to use of hearsay at sentencing).
Petitioner advised his attorney that he wished to pursue these claims, but his
attorney did not provide effective assistance of counsel and waived these claims.
R 182 (italics in original).
And, in fact, appellate counsel did not raise a due process challenge to the court's use of
the hearsay allegations that Mr. Clapp had been driving. According to this Court's Unpublished
Opinion: "On appeal, Clapp does not challenge the district court's decision to revoke probation,
but argues only that this sentence is excessive and that the district court should have further
reduced Clapp's sentence upon revocation of probation." R 108.
As noted above, the court dismissed the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel cause
of action because the allegation that Mr. Clapp had been driving was supported by substantial
credible evidence and that there were other reasons in the record to justify the imposition of
sentence. That determination was in error and cannot be used to justify the dismissal of the
claim.
2.

Why Relief Should be Granted

A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the

13

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v.

California, 3 72 U.S. 353 (1963 ). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852.
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance;
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown ifthere is a reasonable probability that a
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. An
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in

Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007).
Here appellate counsel's performance was deficient for failing to raise the issue that the
evidence relied upon by the court in imposing sentence was not sufficiently reliable because it
was much stronger than the issue actually raised in the appeal. While a sentencing court may
consider information that would not be admissible at trial there must be sufficient indicia of its
reliability. "[A] defendant clearly has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of
materially false incorrect information. Due process requires some minimal indicia of reliability."
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United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9 th Cir) amended, 992 F.2d 1015 (9 th Cir. 1993), cert
denied 510 U.S. 1040 (1994); United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922,931 (9 th Cir. 2001).
Similarly, this Court stated in State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App.
2000), that "a defendant is denied due process when the sentencing judge relies upon information
that is materially untrue or when a judge makes materially false assumptions of fact." 134 Idaho
at 172,997 P.2d at 633 citing State v. Gawron, 124 Idaho 625,627,852 P.2d 317,319 (Ct. App.
1993).
The factual findings of a sentencing court will not be disturbed on appeal so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho 645,330 P.3d 391 (Ct. App.
2014); State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,885,292 P.3d 273,276 (2013). "Substantial evidence is
such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Eddins, supra. Here,
there was not substantial evidence for the court to conclude that Mr. Clapp had driven his
father's truck. Mr. Clapp refused to admit that probation violation allegation and, in fact,
adamantly denied that he had done so. Trial counsel told the court that he had spoken to Mr.
Clapp's father (the owner of the truck) and that he seemed to confirm Mr. Clapp's position. 4 The
only thing before the court was the probation officer's report of violation which alleged Mr.
Clapp admitted he had driven his father's truck, but Mr. Clapp denied making that statement too.
Thus, a reasonable mind would not accept the insufficiently reliable hearsay allegations
contained in that report as sufficient proof of the serious allegations contained therein.
Further, the court's error in considering that evidence was not harmless. The state argued

As part of the prose petition, Mr. Clapp's father provided an affidavit which stated:
"During the time my son lived with me for several years. l never let him use my truck for any
reason[.] To my knowledge he never drove drunk." R 18.
4
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that Mr. Clapp's sentence should be imposed because he was drinking and he was driving. R 86
(T pg. 5, ln. 19 - pg. 6, In. 20) ("Mr. Clapp continues to do what Mr. Clapp wants to do and that
is to drink and that's to drive. And if he is going to do those two things, Your Honor, he is a
danger to have in this community. And ifhe is a danger, he needs to have his sentence
imposed."). Further, the court's comments at the dispositional hearing demonstrate that the court
was mainly concerned with the possibility that Mr. Clapp would drive after drinking and possibly
hurt himself or others. R 88 (T pg. 15, ln. 23 - pg. 16, ln. 11) ("Now, it is only one small step to
driving the truck regularly and driving the truck intoxicated. [,0 And it would be bad enough that
if you just go out there and you get drunk and you drive and kill yourself, but if you kill some
innocent third party, that's about the worse outcome you can have."). Finally, the court denied
Mr. Clapp's Rule 35 motion reiterating the concern for public safety. R 37 ("Furthermore, Mr.
Clapp has also shown that he is not a good candidate for supervision in the community- even
while on probation for a drinking related offense, Mr. Clapp continued to drink and to drive.").
As demonstrated above, the due process issue is meritorious. Had it been raised on
appeal, this Court would have vacated the order revoking probation and remanded for further
proceedings because the court plainly relied upon the allegation as the primary basis for sending
Mr. Clapp to prison. The failure to raise the issue on appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel
under Mintun v. State, supra, and the court erred by summarily dismissing this claim.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Clapp respectfully requests that the order of summary
disposition as to his first cause of action be reversed in part. He also respectfully requests that
the order of summary disposition as to his fifth cause of action be reversed in toto and the matter
16

be remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted

thi~""f't of November, 2014.

DL(,A~clB. ~~""Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Tyler Clapp
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